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Abstract
This paper explores the implications for public policy of the fact that individuals have incom-
plete but private information about their exposure to infectious disease when they make migration
decisions. In a 2-period model we study conditions under which the presence of quarantine measures
may lead to ine¢cient outcomes by strengthening individuals interest in migration to escape centres
of disease and thereby imposing negative externalities on other uninfected individuals. We show rst
that when the disease has an epicentre, the marginal migrant imposes a net negative externality. Sec-
ondly, quarantine policies may sometimes encourage migration instead of discouraging it. Thirdly,
even when they succeed in discouraging migration, quarantine policies may lower social welfare, and
even increase overall disease incidence, if they go too far, thereby discouraging those intra-marginal
migrants for whom private benets exceed private costs by more than the negative externality they
impose on others.
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1 Introduction
This paper studies the e¤ect of public policies to restrict migration by individuals suspected of carrying
disease, when those individuals do not know for certain whether they have the disease but may have more
information than the authorities about their probability of being carriers. It has long been known that
migration a¤ects the spread of disease, and this inuence has for centuries been used to justify placing
restrictions on the movement of individuals suspected of carrying infections1 . For example, immigrants
to the United States were screened for disease on Ellis Island and sometimes kept in quarantine until
considered safe for the rest of the population (see Markel and Stern, 2002). Epidemiological studies
have addressed how individual behaviour, among other factors, a¤ects the spread of infections. However,
the study of how individual behaviour in turn changes in response to the new incentives created by the
occurrence of a disease is much less developed. The principal contribution of our paper is to bring the
study of strategic behavior under uncertainty into the domain of epidemiology, and to analyze its impact,
in interaction with public policies, on the overall impact of epidemic disease.
To our knowledge the work that has been done to date on strategic behavior in the context of disease
considers the economic determinants of preventive behaviour such as vaccination, the adoption of safe
sex (Geo¤ard and Philipson,1996, Philipson, 2000) or the choice of partners (Kremer, 1996). However,
migration as a form of preventive behaviour has received very little attention, although evidence has
accumulated that migration behaviour and epidemics are intrinsically linked. Migration behaviour can
respond very rapidly to changes in the health environment, in particular when it suddenly deteriorates
through epidemics. There are numerous historical instances of people eeing plague or other infectious
diseases by migrating to distant areas (see McNeill, 1997). During the Black Death, for instance, inhabi-
tants from infected villages migrated to less infected villages in the neighbourhood. Much more recently,
after the SARS outbreak in China, workers in urban areas returned in large numbers to live with their
families in safer rural areas2 .
Such behavioural responses are important for understanding the e¤ectiveness of policy measures, in
the context of an increasing demand for national and international regulation of disease control, especially
given the very real fear that antibiotic resistance will soon lead to the recurrence of old diseases no longer
curable by antibiotics and the emergence of new diseases that make regions such as Europe and North
America more vulnerable to epidemics than they have been in the past.
Recently, the outbreak of SARS in China and its rapid transmission across the world (principally
via air travel) demonstrated both the dramatic consequences of the lack of reporting by one state, and,
subsequently, the e¤ectiveness of strict health regulations applied quickly and simultaneously in di¤erent
countries.
1The rst international regulations on health were adopted by twelve European states during a conference held in Paris in
1851 following the failure of the early public health strategies using quarantine and lazarettos to prevent the importation
of contagious diseases through the Mediterranean region. 137 regulations dealing with health issues for maritime tra¢c
included articles that specically mentioned plague, yellow fever and cholera, diseases for which international regulations
and requirements continued until the late 20th century.
2 see Le Point, 16 Mai 2003 pp50-51
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Even if it would be premature to draw conclusions regarding the long-term evolution of SARS, at
least one question needs to be addressed urgently. How e¤ective are quarantine measures and in what
circumstances do they work best? Such measures have often been considered the most e¢cient way to
prevent individuals in an infected area from moving to a non infected area, and they continue to be
used as a systematic response to epidemic outbreaks. For example, when the Black Plague arrived in
Milan, three households were infected. The authorities immediately bricked up the doors and windows,
leaving the human beings and the rats to their fate. "All perished and Milan was spared", as revealed
by historical chronicles (see Benedictow, 2004).
But what happens if individuals have more accurate information on their risk probability than the
state health authorities, and use this information asymmetry strategically? Can economists warn policy
makers about unexpected e¤ects of quarantine regulations, taking into account that individual behaviour
changes in response to policy regulations? The aim of the paper is to study the possibility of such e¤ects,
which, to our knowledge, have not yet been considered in the debates on health and migration. To our
knowledge, only one related paper by Malani and Laxminaryan (2009) notes possible perverse e¤ects of
imposing sanctions on trade partners as they will a¤ect the incentives for surveillance and reporting of
infectious diseases.
We develop a framework where migration responds to the prevalence of disease, to health regulations,
and to the costs of migration. In the absence of quarantine regulations, the di¤erence in disease preva-
lence between two areas provides the sole motive for migration and individuals choose whether or not to
migrate by balancing the health benets of doing so against the monetary (and possibly non-monetary)
costs. Important assumptions that we adopt in our model are that individuals do not know for certain
whether or not they are infected but know more about their prior exposure to the disease than do the
health authorities. Incomplete information is the source of negative externalities as some sick individuals,
who think erroneously that they are healthy, migrate and infect a larger number of healthy individuals
at their destination. The health authorities may decide to apply quarantine measures to correct for
excessive migration. However, asymmetric information about prior exposure has potentially important
consequences for the e¤ect of quarantine measures, which we investigate. The assumption that informa-
tion is asymmetric does not contradict the fact that health authorities may have considerable experience
and statistical information about earlier outbreaks of a disease, including its rate of propagation and
incubation periods, which is captured in our model by the assumption that government knows the dis-
tribution of risk types in the population. We simply assume here that individuals know more about
their idiosyncratic risk of being infected since they know more about their own characteristics (their past
locations, personal habits, living conditions, networks etc...), whereas health authorities can only observe
individuals health status with a lag, once symptoms appear. It also means that the risk characteristics
of individuals who migrate may di¤er in important ways from those of the general population, a fact that
may have a signicant impact on the subsequent evolution of the disease.
At this stage we do not study the e¤ects of quarantine measures in general, many of which a¤ect
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the mobility of goods (see Anderson and James, 1998). But we study the e¤ects of specic quarantine
measures that a¤ect the mobility of individuals and are taken by the health authorities of the country
harbouring the focus of the disease, such as the ones taken by the Chinese authorities or, later on, by
the Canadian authorities after the outbreak of SARS3 . We show merely that behavioural responses to
actual interventions may lead to perverse or undesirable e¤ects. Specically we show that these are more
likely when the period during which individuals do not know whether they are infected, but have more
information about their infection risk than the authorities, is long relative to the speed of propagation
of the disease. Such e¤ects are therefore more likely for diseases such as HIV/AIDS than for Ebola or
SARS, with tuberculosis being an intermediate case.
Our model is very simple, and unrealistic in a number of ways that enable us to nd analytical
solutions. However, it illustrates three very useful and intuitive principles which apply much more
generally than in this particular context, and which we believe will be helpful to analysts and policymakers
in thinking about the impact of public policies towards disease. When disease incidence di¤ers from one
place to another, decisions to migrate involve private benets and costs to the individual concerned which
include changes in their risk of catching the disease. They also impose externalities on others, externalities
that are negative and increasing in the number of uninfected individuals with which the migrant comes
into contact, in the infectiousness of the disease, and in the probability that the migrant is a carrier. This
much is uncontroversial. In our model we show that
 First, when the disease is concentrated in one place (the epicentre of an epidemic for instance), a
decision to migrate away from the epicentre brings a potentially infected individual in contact with
more uninfected individuals than she would have met had she remained where she was. Thus the
typical migrant imposes a net negative externality as a result of her decision to migrate, and the
marginal migrant (for whom, by denition, private benets of migrating just equal the private costs
of doing so) has a negative impact on social welfare. laissez faire will therefore lead to excessive
migration. This provides a rationale for the frequent (and frequently justied) public policy response
to epidemics, which is to attempt to restrict migration away from the epicentre by those who may
be infected.
 Secondly, and less obviously, not all policies that aim to restrict migration in fact do so. In particular,
we distinguish two e¤ects of quarantine policies. The rst is that they raise migration costs, which
lowers migration. For example, mandatory health certicates or test results may be required by
health authorities to leave the epicentre of the disease. We call this a type 1 e¤ect of quarantine
measures. The second e¤ect is that they impose a utility cost on individuals of remaining in the city
where quarantine measures are e¤ective, since they face a chance of being subjected to awkward
and possibly dangerous restrictions on their movements. We call this a type 2 e¤ect of quarantine
3We aknowledge that, in the past, most measures taken at the national level to stop the spread of a disease have been
taken by the authorities of the countries which people are trying to reach. But given the increased need of controlling diseases
at the international level, pressures on the authorities of the country harbouring the infectious diseases have increased.
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measures. Such measures impose a welfare cost on those who su¤er them, which tends to increase
migration by those who are not currently subject to quarantine but fear they may become so if
they remain where they are. Policies implemented without taking type 2 e¤ects into account may
therefore have results that are opposite from those intended.
 Thirdly, even policies that actually reduce migration may have an adverse impact on social welfare if
they reduce migration too much, and specically if they discourage those intra-marginal migrants
whose private benets from migration substantially exceed their private costs of migration, by
enough to outweigh the negative externality they impose on others. Overall disease prevalence may
even increase if in the name of avoiding negative externalities the authorities discourage relatively
low-risk individuals from escaping the epicentre of the disease, thereby increasing the probability
that they will catch the disease there from infected individuals.
The design of quarantine policies needs therefore to be sensitive to the actual incentives for or against
migration created by those policies, as well as to the need to consider the impact on intra-marginal as well
as on marginal migrants. These messages, we believe, have an importance and relevance that extends far
beyond the rather special circumstances of our model.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we set out the assumptions of two-period model in which
individuals face a choice of whether to migrate between two areas that di¤er in the prevalence of disease.
In Section 3 we discuss the implications of di¤erent public policy measures under di¤erent structure of
information and di¤erent types of diseases, before concluding in Section 4.
2 The Model
2.1 Cities and risk of infection
There are two cities, a and b, each containing a continuum of inhabitants. There are two time periods,
t = 0; 1. The size of the population in period 0 is normalized to 1 in city a and N in city b, with
N > 1. Apart from their size and their number of infected individuals, the two cities are identical. At
the outbreak of the epidemic at period 0, ra and rb inhabitants are infected by the disease in city a and
city b respectively; we assume that ra > rb, with minimal loss of generality since all it implies is that
the initial population in which an epidemic is concentrated (the epicentre) is small relative to the total
potentially infected population. We also call ra and rb the initial prevalence levels of the disease in the
two cities. However, individuals may choose to migrate between the cities and this will a¤ect prevalence
levels in the second period. In equilibrium, and as a result of the various decisions a¤ecting migration
made by individuals and by the authorities, there will be Na and Nb inhabitants infected by the disease
in the two cities in period 1.
We write sijt 2 (h; s) for the state of health of individual i in city j in period t, where h is the healthy
state and s is the sick state. An individual does not know her own state of health in period 0, learning
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this only in period 1. However, everyone (individuals plus the authorities) knows the prevalence levels of
the disease ra and rb.
Nevertheless, individuals have some information about the extent of their prior exposure to the disease,
which we interpret simply as the probability that they have already caught the disease in period 0. We
write eij for the exposure of individual i in city j (it will often be convenient to drop the subscript j
without risk of confusion); in the analysis below we make a variety of di¤erent assumptions about how
eij is distributed across individuals.
We rst assume that the factors a¤ecting previous exposure are purely random and have no bearing
on the individuals future risk of catching the disease. So the risk for a previously uninfected individual
of catching the disease in period 1 depends only on the infectiousness  of the disease, and on the number
of infected individuals Nj in the city where she decides to live
4 . We will refer to diseases of this kind as
"type-insensitive" epidemics. Formally, we write this as follows:
pr(sijt+1 = sjsijt = h) = Nj (1)
We discuss later the robustness of our results for other types of epidemics, for which the risk of future
infection depends on the same factors that determined past exposure. We will refer to diseases of the
latter kind as "type-sensitive". A good example would be a disease such as AIDS in which individual
sexual behavior determines exposure, so that those whose behavior makes them more likely to have been
infected in the past are also, if still uninfected, more likely to become infected in the future for given
prevalence levels.
The fact that the risk of infection is increasing in the prevalence of the disease in the chosen city
is important because it implies that individuals will choose whether or not to migrate between cities in
response to di¤erences in the prevalence levels5 . However, not all individuals will make the same choices.
This is not (in our simple framework) because of di¤erences in their migration costs or in their ability
to a¤ord those costs, since we assume migration costs and incomes to be identical across individuals.
Rather, their choices will di¤er because of their prior exposure to the disease. This happens in two ways.
First, individuals are more likely to migrate, other things equal, if they have had lower prior exposure,
since that increases the probability that they are healthy - only healthy individuals are at risk of catching
the disease since infected individuals have caught it already. Secondly, under type-sensitive epidemics,
individuals are more likely to migrate if their individual exposure is higher, since it makes them more
sensitive to the environment in which they live. This means, other things equal, that migration is more
4The equations would be more complex and non-linear if we assumed that the risk depended not on the number but on
the proportion of infected individuals in the city in question. However, we have no reason to think that this would a¤ect the
qualitative insights of the model, and the absolute numbers assumption has a natural interpretation: in a city centre which
every citizen passes, the risk of infection is a function of the total number of dangerous pathogens in the environment, not
the proportion of dangerous ones to innocuous ones.
5We deliberately ignore here the possibility that cities may di¤er in the quality of preventive or curative medical care
available. It is possible that cities with high disease prevalence may be more, not less attractive to uninfected individuals,
for instance if they also o¤er vaccination whose e¤ects outweigh those of greater disease prevalence, or if prior residence
is a condition of access to treatment. This qualication should be borne in mind when interpreting our results, though
historically we do not believe such phenomena have been common.
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likely given higher past exposure. The net impact of these two e¤ects will be considered in more detail
below.
2.2 Social welfare
Individual migration decisions a¤ect social welfare and not just individual welfare. This is because they
generate externalities - in this framework because an infected individual creates a risk for the uninfected
individuals that surround her (the migration decision of an uninfected individual creates no externalities).
To see this, we rst study the objective of public policy.
Denotem the migration costs, d the utility costs of being infected, ns (nh) the number of sick (healthy)
individuals who migrate from city a to b. Na (Nb) the number of infected individuals living in city a (b).
To ensure that at least one individual will wish to migrate and that not all will do so we assume that
(1  e)(ra   rb)d < m < (1  e)(ra   rb)d (2)
with e being the lowest and e being the highest value of ei in city a.
The authorities wish to minimize I, the sum of the utility costs of infection plus the costs of migration,
which we can write as:
I = d(Na +Nb) +m(nh + ns) (3)
As, after migration, Na = (1 ra nh) (ra   ns) ns+ra and Nb = (N rb+nh) (rb + ns)+ns+rb,
it is easy to derive
@I
@nh
= d (rb   ra + 2ns) +m (4)
and show that, for ns small,
@I
@nh
< 0 as condition (2) holds. Moreover, @I
@ns
> 0 as:
@I
@ns
= d (N   1  rb + ra + 2nh) +m (5)
Therefore public policy should minimize the number of sick migrants, ns, which optimally should be
equal to 0; and maximize the number of healthy migrants, nh.
These optimal migration ows come from the specication of the infection function (equation 1),
which implies that the total number of infected individuals is minimized when healthy individuals go to
the city with fewer sick individuals and when sick individuals stay in the city with a high number of
infected individuals.
2.3 The incentives for migration
To understand how individuals with di¤erent risk exposure take di¤erent decisions, assume for the moment
that individuals migrate from one city to another on the basis of current prevalence levels in the two
cities; in other words they have adaptive expectations about infection risk. This is a simplication because
it ignores the way in which individuals anticipate future evolution of prevalence levels in both cities by
taking into account feedback e¤ects of the decisions of individuals like themselves. However, it is useful to
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understand how incentives to migrate depend on the information individuals have on their prior exposure
to the disease.
Denote y the per capita income generated in each city. Then the utility if an individual of type ei
chooses to migrate is written as6 :
Um =  m+ ei(y   d) + rb(1  ei)(y   d) + (1  ei)(1  rb)y
The utility if an individual of type ei chooses not to migrate is:
Un = ei(y   d) + ra(1  ei)(y   d) + (1  ei)(1  ra)y
So individual i will wish to migrate as long as:
m < (1  ei)(ra   rb)d (6)
Equation 6 shows that individual i will wish to migrate to the low prevalence city as long as the migration
cost, m, is smaller than the migration benet (on the right hand side of the inequality). This benet is
higher the lower is prior exposure ei and the higher the di¤erence between prevalence levels in the two
cities. By re-arranging equation 6 we can derive a threshold exposure
eA = 1 
m
d(ra   rb)
(7)
such that all individuals having an exposure factor below eA migrate to the less infected city. This
simply reects the fact that individuals who are more likely to be uninfected derive greater benet from
migrating and are more likely to do so. We will see in Section 3.3 that this conclusion is di¤erent in a
model with type-sensitive infections, where both high and low risks may choose not to migrate.
It is evident that eA is decreasing in m, so that higher values of m lower overall migration levels.
In the remainder of the paper, we assume, instead, that migrants have rational expectations about
prevalence levels in the two cities in period 1. That is, when they make their migration decisions in period
0 they do not assume that current prevalence levels will continue to hold in the future; they take into
account that others are reasoning as they do. The rationale for this is not necessarily that individuals are
perfectly far-sighted but rather that it determines a migration equilibrium, such that, after migration
takes place, no individuals have any further interest in migrating, once they have taken into account the
migration behaviour of other individuals.
Although the assumption of rational expectations seems signicantly di¤erent from that of adaptive
expectations about infection risk, and leads to quantitatively di¤erent behavioral responses, these re-
sponses and the equilibria to which they give rise are qualitatively no di¤erent from those that occur
under adaptive expectations. All of the results we report below, derived under rational expectations,
remain true under the hypothesis of adaptive expectations. The reason is not di¢cult to understand.
6Results would have been the same, if, instead of assuming risk neutrality, we had assumed that all individuals had the
same degree of risk aversion. Moreover, we ignore the e¤ect of heterogeneity in the degree of risk aversion in order to focus
on one dimension of heterogeneity, that is in the degree of exposure to risk.
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Individuals migrate in response to perceived di¤erences in infection risk between the two cities. If they
take into account the fact that others will reason as they do, this will dampen but not completely o¤set
their behavioral response, since migration will diminish the prevalence di¤erence between cities that was
the original spur to migration. We demonstrate this more formally in Lemma 1 below.
In the simple framework we have set out here, if individuals knew perfectly whether or not they are
infected there would be no public policy issue and no need for intervention, since infected individuals, who
are the only ones whose migration decision creates externalities, would have no incentive to migrate. The
problem arises because of incomplete information about health risk: migration occurs because individuals
believe themselves to be healthy with some probability and therefore believe they will benet from moving
to a place where they are less likely to be exposed to infection. However, migration creates externalities
because those same individuals have also a positive probability of being infected and therefore of infecting
other healthy individuals with whom they come into contact. We now discuss the public policy issues
posed by these externalities.
3 E¤ects of Policy Measures
To see the kind of perverse e¤ects policy interventions may generate when individuals do not have perfect
information on their infection status, we rst study the case where individuals know everything, which
leads to a First-Best Optimum. Then, we introduce the case where individuals have heterogeneous risks
of having been infected in the past, which will lead to them to respond di¤erently to migration incentives.
Since the authorities do not know the health status of each individual, they can only apply policy measures
(such as quarantine) that in principle a¤ect both healthy and sick individuals. Furthermore, individuals
will react to those measures on the basis of the knowledge of their own prior exposure, which a¤ects their
gains from migration.
We rst consider the case of type-insensitive infections where individuals have the same ex-ante risk
of being infected in the future, conditional on being uninfected today. In this case, some asymptomatic
sick people wish to migrate, because they erroneously believe they can avoid being infected. Although
the externality imposed by migrating individuals on healthy individuals in their city of destination varies
among individuals, provided the authorities know the distribution of this risk they can calculate the
optimum level of migration and the externality imposed by the marginal migrant at this optimum: the
risk threshold corresponding to the marginal migrant is unique, and those who migrate are those whose
chance of infecting others is below that of the marginal migrant. This allows the authorities to set a
(Pigouvian) tax on migration that implements the optimum.
Finally, we turn to the case of type-sensitive infections where individuals have heterogeneous risks of
being infected in the future, which are correlated to what they know about their past exposure. We show
that in this case there are two "migration" thresholds. As health authorities do not know exactly about
the risk type of individuals migrants, they cannot tax them for the negative externalities they generate,
so the policy can no longer implement the First Best.
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3.1 First Best Laissez Faire Optimum under Complete Information
We rst assume that individuals know perfectly whether they are infected or not.
As the only migration gains are the di¤erential in infected individuals between the two cities and there
are positive migration costs, sick individuals prefer not to migrate, whereas healthy individuals migrate
if migration gains are higher than migration costs, that is if :
m < d(ra   rb) (8)
So there is a positive selection of individuals through migration. In other words, there is a private
incentive to self-quarantine, which leads to rst-best outcomes when people are perfectly informed
about their own infection status : healthy individuals migrate into the city where the number of infected
individuals is low and health authorities do not need to intervene to maximise social welfare.
Note that it makes no di¤erence whether individuals have adaptive or rational expectations. Rational
expectations would require individuals to take into account in their migration decision the fact that
individuals like themselves may migrate and thereby a¤ect the number of sick individuals in both cities
at equilibrium. However, when individuals know their infection status, only healthy individuals have an
interest in migrating, and the number of sick individuals in each city does not change. So the policy
implications are exactly the same whether individuals have rational expectations or not.
In all cases, migration under laissez faire leads to the First Best Optimum.
3.2 First Best Policy under Incomplete Information
3.2.1 Quarantine measures when healthy individuals face equal risks of future infection
but have heterogeneous prior exposure
We now consider the case where individuals do not know perfectly whether they have been infected or
not. If all individuals were unaware of their likelihood of being infected there would be no di¤erences in
resulting behavior and also no real public policy problem. Instead, however, we assume that individuals
know their own prior exposure and therefore their probability of being infected, but that their risk of
being infected in the future, conditional on being uninfected today, is unrelated to the factors that have
made them more or less likely to be infected today. It is therefore those who are least likely to be already
infected who are most likely to gain from migrating away from the epicentre of the infection. However,
to the extent that some of them may be infected without knowing it, they impose a negative externality
on uninfected individuals in their destination. We consider whether public policy can correct for this
externality without knowing the exposure of particular individuals.
As individuals take into account the fact that other sick individuals may migrate to the low prevalence
city, the utility of an individual of type ei chooses to migrate is now written as:
Um =  m+ ei(y   d) + (1  ei)(rb + ns)(y   d) + (1  ei)(1  (rb + ns))y
The utility if an individual of type ei chooses not to migrate is:
Un = ei(y   d) + (1  ei)(ra   ns)(y   d) + (1  ei)(1  (ra   ns))y
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So individual i will wish to migrate as long as net gains from migration are positive, i.e.:
0  d(1  ei)(ra   rb   2ns) m (9)
Note that this di¤ers from equation 6 by the inclusion of the term 2ns - the migrant takes into account
that others like herself will be migrating between periods 0 and 1.
We can study the impact of quarantine measures on migration incentives in general, without solving
for the migration equilibrium level, ns, by dening the exposure level e
 of the marginal migrant, dened
as one for whom net gains from migration, dened by equation (9), equal zero. This marginal migrant is
therefore:
e = 1 
m
d(ra   rb   2ns)
(10)
It is useful to begin by dening Ii  d(1   ei)(ra   rb   2ns) as the gross gains from migration for
individual of type ei, and establishing
Lemma 1: I is strictly decreasing in ei:
Proof : For a given migration equilibrium level ns,
@
I
@ei
=  d(ra   rb   2ns). By inequality 9,
(ra   rb   2ns) > 0;so
@
I
@ei
< 0: QED
Lemma 1 shows that those who migrate will be all and only those whose exposure levels lie below the
threshold; the fact that individuals have rational expectations has not changed matters in this respect.
This also implies that ns must be weakly increasing in e
:
It is also straightforward to show that:
Lemma 2: e is strictly decreasing in m.
Proof : The proof is by contradiction. Suppose instead that e is weakly increasing in m. Since ns
is weakly increasing in e, and therefore in m, the denominator of the second term on the RHS of (10)
is decreasing in m. Since the numerator of this second term is itself m this means that the second term
is strictly increasing in m and therefore that e is strictly decreasing in m, contrary to our assumption.
QED
Note that this establishes for rational expectations the equivalent monotonicity property that holds
for eA, the migration threshold under adaptive expectations, and underlines that rational expectations
dampen but do not fully o¤set the behavioral responses under adaptive expectations.
This then allows us to state Proposition 1, proven in the Appendix:
Proposition 1: For type-insensitive epidemics, when exposure levels are distributed continuously
over [e; e]:
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a) For anym there exists a unique exposure threshold dened implicitly by e = e = 1  m
d(ra rb 2ns)
;
all individuals with exposure levels below this threshold (and only these individuals) will migrate to the
low prevalence city.
b) The equilibrium level of migration at this exposure threshold is ine¢cient, and a marginal reduction
in migration would reduce I.
c) For N > 5 there exists a unique exposure threshold e = ewhich minimizes I, and a unique strictly
positive migration tax mt which implements this optimum.
What does Proposition 1 tell us? Migration entails two types of change in welfare. First, migration
imposes a negative externality as migrants will encounter a larger number of healthy individuals in the
destination area than in their area of origin, thereby increasing the overall exposure of others to infection
risk. Secondly, the marginal migrant has, by denition, no private gains from migration. Therefore the
marginal migrant entails, in this case, net overall social welfare losses, as migration still entails negative
externalities and private gains of the marginal migrant are zero. Proposition 1 simply says that, provided
exposure types are continuously distributed so that there is always a positive density of migrants within
an arbitrarily small distance of the exposure threshold, the level of migration under laissez faire will be
ine¢cient in the sense that a marginal reduction would always increase social welfare. A condition for
Proposition 1 to hold is that N > 5, which we can interpret as the condition that the disease has an
"epicentre", meaning that the place from which outmigration takes place is small relative to the overall
population at risk.
It is important to emphasize that, although the suboptimality of the laissez faire equilibrium follows
from Proposition 1 (provided e is continuously distributed), it does not follow that any given quarantine
measure will improve matters. If quarantine measures of type 1 are implemented, so that migration cost
is now m0 > m, the marginal migrant is now dened by e = 1  m
0
d(ra rb 2ns)
and we see that e < e
so that migration has decreased. However, e could be higher or lower than the optimum, so it does not
follow that type 1 measures are necessarily an improvement on the status quo; they may overshoot.
If quarantine measures of type 2 are implemented, so that there is a utility cost q to remaining in
city a, the marginal migrant is now dened by e = 1   m q
d(ra rb 2ns)
and we see that e > e. If
there is a strictly positive density of exposure types there will be a strictly positive mass of types between
e and e, so migration will increase, which will lower social welfare. Therefore, implementing type 2
quarantine measures can actually be worse than doing nothing.
So even if health authorities do not observe individual types, they may apply rst best policy measures
based on the knowledge of the risk distribution in the population. But the details of the policy matter,
and policies devised with good intentions but without attention to detail may end up being ine¤ective or
even making things worse. We will see below that the type of policy measures that are desirable can be
very sensitive to the distribution of risk types.
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3.2.2 Discrete risk types
In this section we consider what happens when individuals fall into one of two exposure types, low and
high exposure. In these cases the conditions for Proposition 1 do not hold. Specically, if e is not
continuously distributed on [e; e], there may be no positive mass of individuals lying between the laissez
faire threshold e and the optimum threshold e so that the laissez faire level of migration may already
be optimal. In addition, when the distribution is discrete a small change in the costs of migration may
induce a discrete change in migration which may overshoot; there may be no way of inducing just enough
migration to attain the optimum and any intervention that a¤ects migration may a¤ect it strictly for the
worse.
Migration therefore has ambiguous impacts on social welfare in general in the discrete type case. The
results of the welfare analysis will depend on where the low and high types individuals are positioned
compared to the migration threshold under laissez faire, and specically on whether either type, no type
or both types may migrate in equilibrium; on how low is the exposure of low type individuals; and on
how policy measures a¤ect migration costs and the disutility of living in the epicentre of the disease.
Since the conditions for Proposition 1 no longer hold when types are discrete, migration under laissez
faire may be optimal. This is formally shown by Proposition 2 in the Appendix. If, for example, low
type individuals are low risk enough and are willing to migrate under laissez faire whereas high-type
individuals are not, the negative externality entailed by migration of low type individuals is more than
compensated by the positive private gains, and migration increases overall social welfare. From this
it follows naturally that discouraging low type individuals by quarantine measures of type 1 worsens
social welfare (Proposition 3a in the Appendix) and that encouraging high type individuals to migrate
by quarantine measures of type 2 worsens social welfare (Proposition 3b in the Appendix), as high risk
individuals who migrate entail excessive negative externalities. Moreover, pure-strategy equilibria may
not exist : the fact that all members of one risk type migrate may reverse their migration incentives.
This may, in turn, make it impossible to implement the optimum with a migration tax.
Nevertheless, welfare-improving interventions may exist and Proposition 4 in the Appendix describes
formally the conditions under which they do.
Once again, even where welfare-improving policy interventions exist they must be carefully designed
to encourage only low type individuals to migrate. The quarantine measure should not "overshoot",
moving from a situation in which neither type of individual migrates to one in which both types migrate,
or vice versa - unless even the low-risk types are su¢ciently high-risk that it is better for society that
they do not migrate at all.
3.3 Absence of First Best Policy under Asymmetric Information
We now turn to the case of "type-sensitive epidemics", which are characterised by the fact that individuals
with di¤erent exposure to the disease have also di¤erent risk of being infected in the future. For simplicity
we will suppose that the risk of future infection of a healthy individual is simply proportional to past
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exposure (as well as to the disease- and city-specic factors just described):
pr(sijt+1 = sjsijt = h) = eijNj (11)
However, even without proportionality the qualitative insights of the model would remain unchanged so
long as risk is increasing in past exposure.
For such "type-sensitive infections", migration incentives are more complicated as they are are non-
monotonic in risk type, which determines two migration thresholds. So if the government does not know
exactly the infectious statut of migrants, we will see that individuals cannot be taxed correctly.
We rst solve for the new migration thresholds.
Using equation (11) instead of equation (1), the gross gains from migration to individual i become
S  ei(1  ei)(ra   rb   2ns)d (12)
where ns is once again endogenous, and will depend on the distribution of exposure levels.
It is evident that, unlike I , S is not monotonic in ei. Indeed, it follows immediately from (12) that
Proposition 5: When epidemics are type-sensitive, migrants have rational expectations and exposure
levels are continuously distributed, for any given migration cost m and migration level ns, there exist
two thresholds e0 and e1, which are solutions to the quadratic equation ei   e
2
i = m=d(ra   rb   2ns);
such that any individual of risk type ei  [e0; e1] chooses to migrate.
An illustration of the migration thresholds is given in Figure 1.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
Therefore, when types are continuously distributed, any change in migration cost will change the
number of migrants in the neighborhood of both the low and the high thresholds. At a laissez faire
equilibrium, marginal migrants at both ends of the distribution will impose negative externalities through
encountering a larger number of healthy individuals in the destination area than in their area of origin,
thereby increasing the overall exposure of others to infection risk. At the same time, private gains of
migration are zero at both migration thresholds. So, overall, there is always too much migration under
laissez faire when the distribution of exposure levels is continuous and the same policy implications follow
as for a continuous distribution in the case of type insensitive epidemics.
It should be noted, however, that the magnitude of the externality imposed by the marginal migrants
at the upper and lower thresholds respectively is not the same, since migrants at the high threshold
increase the prevalence rate in the destination city by more than migrants at the low threshold. This
means that any policy that imposes the same cost on all migrants (as is likely given the governments
inability to distinguish risk types of apparently healthy individuals) will be ine¢cient compared to an
optimal Pigouvian-type tax that taxed each individual according to the externality she imposed on
others. Such a Pigouvian policy is infeasible here because of asymmetric information, which is one of the
di¢culties faced by public intervention in this context.
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The intuition of the welfare analysis for type insensitive epidemics in the simple examples studied
above when exposure levels were discretely distributed continues to hold in this case : there are some
cases where policy measures may be welfare improving and other cases where policy measures may be
welfare decreasing. Once again this will depend on where the low and high types individuals are positioned
compared to the two migration thresholds under laissez faire such that either type, no type or both types
may migrate in equilibrium; on how low the low type individuals are; and on how policy measures are
designed to a¤ect migration costs or/and the disutility of living in the epicentre of the disease.
The point remains that policy needs to be designed with a careful attention to detail - not only can
quarantine measures encourage instead of discourage migration, but they may a¤ect individuals with
quite di¤erent categories of risk exposure, with consequently quite di¤erent impacts on the welfare of
others.
4 Discussions and conclusion
Our model has, rst, highlighted the fact that the e¤ectiveness of quarantine measures in the presence
of epidemics is highly sensitive both to the type of the disease and to the information individuals have
about their risk of being infected.
Since migration is motivated by the di¤erence in prevalence levels between the two cities, individuals
who are less likely to be infected derive greater benet from migrating away from the epicentre of the
disease. This leads to a private incentive to self-quarantine, which, when people are perfectly informed
about their own infection status, leads to rst-best outcomes.
This incentive is imperfect when people have imperfect information about their own infection status.
In this case, migration imposes net negative externalities by increasing the rate of exposure faced by the
uninfected outside the epicentre of the epidemic. In and of itself, this problem can be solved through
traditional Pigouvian taxes to implement the optimum migration level, as the authorities can calculate
the externality imposed by the marginal migrant and correct for it provided they know the distribution of
exposure types. When this distribution is continuous and the disease has an epicentre a unique welfare-
maximizing migration level exists and can be implemented by a (unique) migration tax. However, there
is a risk that migration measures can overshoot. This risk is particularly great when the distribution of
risk types is discrete (or, more generally, concentrated at certain points) sincelaissez faire outcomes may
be already optimal and measures that a¤ect migration may easily overshoot.
However, traditional policy correctives may fail when epidemics are type-sensitive, since individuals
vary in their ex ante risk of acquiring the disease, and this variation is likely to be unobservable to
policymakers. In this case, there are two migration thresholds and the externality due to migration
varies across individuals but policymakers are not able to construct a schedule of taxes that varies
correspondingly. If they impose a uniform tax on migration, the costs imposed on the low-risk marginal
migrant will likely be too high, and that on the high-risk individuals likely too low. In these conditions,
the loss imposed on the low-risk (high risk) may be larger (smaller) than the gains enjoyed by the society
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that averts migration by some infected individuals, and it is not obvious whether policies restricting
migration may or may not end up improving welfare on balance.
The points above imply that when modes of transmission are unknown and ex ante infection risk is
more likely to be continuous, quarantine measures or other disincentives to migration may be benecial
provided they are designed with caution so that they do not overshoot. On the other hand, the prob-
ability that policy intervention produces perverse outcomes increases when exposure risks are known to
individuals but not perfectly so, in a way that is unobservable to policy makers (such as in the case of a
sexually transmitted disease).
Second, our paper has highlighted the fact that although quarantine of individuals who have been
identied as sick reduces (obviously) the propensity of these individuals to migrate and spread the disease,
the threat of quarantine increases the propensity to migrate of other individuals who have not yet been
fallen sick but who know themselves to be at risk.7 This is surely one of the reasons why the health
authorities in Toronto encouraged self-applied quarantine measures after the SARS outbreak. The idea
was to encourage individuals voluntarily to adopt quarantine measures and go to the hospitals to get
preventive treatment in case they were at risk of having been infected.
It is worth noting that, to the extent that individuals in fact migrate for reasons other than their
infection risk, individuals who already know themselves to be infected may nevertheless wish to migrate
following ill-considered quarantine measures and may thus pose a public policy problem. The points we
make here about the risk of increasing rather than diminishing migration through ill-considered quarantine
regulations would still be relevant.
How important these perverse e¤ects are in practice will clearly depend on the degree of incomplete
information and of asymmetry between individuals and the authorities, which will depend on the nature
of the disease. This will also depend on how long is the incubation period of the disease during which such
imperfections can be expected to last. That diseases di¤er greatly in the extent of imperfect information
and asymmetries explains, among other reasons, why quarantine may be comparatively e¤ective at halting
the spread of a disease such as SARS, while it would be ine¤ective or even counter-productive at halting
the spread of HIV/AIDS.
Similar considerations apply to many of the other new pathogens that have emerged in the last
25 years, including not only the Ebola virus, HIV and Hepatitis C but also lesser known pathogens
such as Legionella pneumophilia, E coli 0157:H7, Borrelia burgdorferi, Helicobacter pylori, Hantavirus,
Cryptosporidia, Ehrlichiosis, H5N1 (or Avian u), and Nipah. Most of these pathogens have incubation
periods greater than standard travel times. For example, after the SARS virus enters the body, it
requires 3-10 days incubation period before the disease appears, which is much longer than the duration
of any trip by air. Hence an adequate response to the outbreak is indeed to encourage individuals to go to
health centers when they suspect they may have been infected with SARS, instead of applying traditional
7For an account of the reactions of individuals to this type of quarantine restrictions during the SARS epidemic in China,
including ways in which restrictions were evaded, see In Liaoning by Jon Cannon, London Review of Books, 25(11), 5
June 2003.
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non-voluntary quarantine measures to restrict migration away from the epicentre by those who may be
infected8 .
We may also want to consider the case of re-emerging infectious diseases such as malaria, tuberculosis,
dengue, yellow fever or cholera. However, for these diseases, it may be important to consider disease
prevalence as a more long-term characteristic of a given area and, hence, a determinant of both the
long-term location of individuals and the development process, as we study in a companion paper on
migration and endemic disease, Mesnard and Seabright (2009).
We cannot claim to have done more than indicate in a simple and stylized context the complexity of
the considerations that public health policies must take into account, but we hope to have shown that
when individuals have incomplete private information about their exposure to disease, their strategic be-
haviour may have important e¤ects on public health outcomes that policymakers cannot a¤ord to ignore.
Furthermore, some much simpler and more general messages can be derived than just the conclusion that
everything is complicated and the authorities need to take the specic circumstances of the disease into
account. As we stated in the introduction, three principles in particular apply much more widely than in
the specic circumstances of our model. First, when the disease has an epicentre, the marginal migrant
imposes a net negative externality. Secondly, quarantine policies may encourage migration instead of dis-
couraging it, specically on the part of individuals who are not currently sick but fear they may become
so in the future. Thirdly, even when they succeed in discouraging migration, quarantine policies may
lower social welfare, and even increase overall disease incidence, if they go too far, thereby discouraging
those intra-marginal migrants for whom private benets substantially exceed private costs, by enough
to outweigh the negative externality they impose on others. These principle are ones that could help in
designing better quarantine policies even in circumstances to which the assumptions of our model do not
literally apply.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Continuous distribution of risk types
Proof of Proposition 1:
a) Assumption (2) generalised to the case with rational expectations (i.e. with ns endogenous) implies
that e > 1   m
d(ra rb 2ns)
> e. Since e is continuous on [e; e], by the intermediate value theorem there
exists e = 1   m
d(ra rb 2ns)
. Lemma 1 implies that individuals with ei > e
 have gross gains from
migration less than m, and individuals with ei < e
 have gross gains from migration greater than m.
b) The rst derivative of I with respect to e can be written as
dI
de
= f(e)e
@I
@ns
+ f(e) (1  e)
@I
@nh
(13)
with f(e)the density of the distribution at e. If e is continuously distributed f(e) is strictly positive
on [e; e].
Substituting equations 4 and 5 and collecting terms in m yields
dI
de
= f(e) fm+ (1  e) [d (rb   ra + 2ns)] + e [d (N   1  rb + ra + 2nh)]g (14)
Equation 10 implies that m+ (1  e) [d (rb   ra + 2ns)] = 0, so when
dI
de
is evaluated at e = e, the
rst two terms on the RHS of equation (14) are zero. Thus we are left with
dI
de
= f(e)e [d (N   1  rb + ra + 2nh)] (15)
which is strictly positive given that f(e) is strictly positive. This implies that at e = emigration is
ine¢cient: a reduction in e would strictly reduce costs.
c) We can dene e as the level of e at which dI
de
= 0 if this holds on e 2 [0; 1], and otherwise as e = 0.
First we show that if dI
de
= 0 holds on e 2 [0; 1], it is a unique minimum. Next we show that if it does
not hold anywhere on e 2 [0; 1] then e = 0 is a unique minimum of I.
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To show that, if dI
de
= 0 holds on e 2 [0; 1], it is a unique minimum, write
dI
de
= f(e)	 (16)
where
	  fm+ (1  e) [d (rb   ra + 2ns)] + e [d (N   1  rb + ra + 2nh)]g
and
d	
de
= d(N   1 + 2nh   2ns + 2(ra   rb) + e
@
@e
(2nh   2ns))
Noting that @ns
@e
= e and @nh
@e
= 1  e we can write @
@e
(nh   ns) = (1  e)  e = 1  2e and therefore
derive
d	
de
= d (N   1 + 2nh   2ns + 2(ra   rb) + 2e (1  2e))
First, note that d	
de
> 0 if N > 5 since 2nh   2ns is bounded below at  2, ra   rb > 0 and 2e (1  2e)
is bounded below at  2.
Since d	
de
> 0, 	 > 0 for all e > e and 	 < 0 for all e < e. Since f(e) is strictly positive everywhere
this implies that I is monotonically decreasing in e at e < e and monotonically increasing at e > e. Thus
for any strictly positive density function, e is the unique minimum of I if dI
de
= 0. If dI
de
= 0 does not hold
on e 2 [0; 1] then since dI
de
> 0 at e = e, dI
de
> 0 must hold at all 0  e < e implying that e = 0 is a
unique minimum of I on [0; 1]. Thus e is the unique minimum of I.
The migration tax mt that implements the optimum can be calculated by evaluating equation (14) at
e = e and noting that
m+mt + (1  e) [d (rb   ra + 2ens)] = 0 (17)
which implies that
mt = e[d (N   1  rb + ra + 2enh)] (18)
The uniqueness of mt follows from the fact that it is strictly increasing in e, since enh is itself strictly
increasing in e. If they know the distribution of ei (and therefore the values of nh and ns for any threshold
e), the authorities can calculate e using (14) and thereby calculate mt. QED.
6.2 Discrete distribution of risk types
We now consider a simple example where individuals can be of only two risk types, which we refer to as
low-exposure and high-exposure.
Proposition 2: If exposure levels are discretely distributed between two types, so that the exposure
factor ei  feL; eHg with p the proportion of individuals with low exposure level, and if eL < 1  
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m
d(ra rb 2peL)
< eH , then the unique laissez faire equilibrium has migration by all and only the low-
exposure individuals, and there exists a threshold t such that if eL < t this outcome is second-best
optimal9 , where t is the lower root of the quadratic equation (A+BeL + Ce
2
L) = 0; where
A  mp  dp(ra   rb);
B  d(N   1 + 2p+ 2(ra   rb));
C  2pd;
Proof of Proposition 2:
From the conditions on eL and eH it follows immediately that all and only low-exposure individuals
migrate. Thus ns = peL and nh = p (1  eL) and we can dene I
, the intermediate migration social
disutility level, by
I = mp+ d(1  ra   p (1  eL)) (ra   peL)+ ra   peL +
(N   rb + p (1  eL)) (rb + peL)+ rb + peL
We rst show that this is lower than the no-migration disutility level, dened by :
I0 = d [(1  ra) (ra)+ ra + (N   rb) (rb)+ rb]
Subtracting yields:
I   I0 = p(A+BeL + Ce
2
L); where
A  m  d(ra   rb);
B  d(N   1 + 2p+ 2(ra   rb));
C   2pd:
Noting that equation 9 implies that A < 0, that B > 0 because N > 1 and ra > rb, and that C < 0, it
follows that A+BeL +Ce
2
L is a quadratic function with a negative intercept, which admits two positive
real roots. Substituting eL = 1 and noting that A+B +C > 0, we can show that, for eL = 1; I
   I0 is
positive. So only one of the two roots lies between 0 and 1 . We denote this root t:
Therefore I   I0 is negative if eL < t where t is the lower root of the quadratic equation A+BeL +
Ce2L = 0:
To see that I is also lower than the all-migration level Ia in which all individuals leave city a for city
1, note that as nh + ns = 1 and, after migration, Nb = (N   rb + (1  ra)) (rb + ra)+ ra + rb, we can
write
Ia = dNb +m = d [DE+ E] +m
where D  (N   rb + (1  ra)) and E  ra + rb
9What we mean by "second-best" optimality is optimal "in the set of feasible policies where the government can control
m and q".
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We can write
I = d [FG+HI+ E] +mp
where F  (1  ra   p (1  eL) ;
G  (ra   peL) ;
H  (N   rb + p (1  eL));
I  (rb + peL).
Therefore we obtain easily: Ia   I = m(1  p) + d(DE   FG HI).
Noting that D = H + F and E = G+ I, we can write:
Ia   I = m(1  p) + d(HG+ FI), which is necessarily strictly positive. QED
We can also show the results of two types of quarantine policy that can lead to sub-optimal outcomes:
Proposition 3: If exposure levels are discretely distributed between two types, so that the exposure
factor ei  feL; eHg with p the proportion of individuals with low exposure level, and if eL < 1  
m
d(ra rb 2peL)
< eH , then
a) if a quarantine intervention of type 1 raises migration cost to m0 such that eL > 1 
m0
d(ra rb)
, the
unique equilibrium has zero migration by both exposure types, which if eL < t is second-best sub-optimal
since low-risk types are not separated from high-risk types;
b) if a quarantine intervention of type 2 imposes a disutility cost of q on sick individuals in city a such
that eH < 1 
m q
d(ra rb 2peL)
, there exists no equilibrium in pure strategies, and the sole mixed-strategy
equilibrium has a proportion  < 1 of high-risk types migrating, with  the solution to the equation
1  m q
d(ra rb 2peL 2(1 p)eH)
= eH . If eL < t this is also suboptimal since a proportion of high-risk types
are not separated from low-risk types.
Proof:
a) follows immediately from the denition of the migration threshold;
b) follows from noting that if all individuals in city a migrated to city b there would remain no infected
individuals in city a, so migration would no longer be an equilibrium. QED
Proposition 4 then immediately implies conditions under which welfare-improving interventions may
exist :
Proposition 4: If exposure levels are discretely distributed between two types, so that the exposure
factor ei  feL; eHg with p the proportion of individuals with low exposure level, then:
a) if 1   m
d(ra rb 2peL)
< eL < eH , no individuals migrate, which is sub-optimal if eL < t , but
a second-best optimal migration can be induced by a quarantine intervention of type 2 such that m  
d(ra   rb   2peL) (1  eH) > q > m  d(ra   rb   2peL) (1  eL);
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b) if eL < eH < 1  
m
d(ra rb 2peL)
, there exists no equilibrium in pure strategies, and the sole
equilibrium has all low-risk types migrating and a proportion  < 1 of high-risk types migrating, with 
the solution to the equation 1  m
d(ra rb 2peL 2(1 p)eH)
= eH .
If eL < t , second-best optimal migration can be induced by a quarantine intervention of type 1 which
raises m to m0 such that d(ra   rb   2peL) (1  eL) > m
0 > d(ra   rb   2peL) (1  eH);
c) if eL  t the second-best optimum has zero migration, which can be induced by a quarantine
intervention of type 1 such that m0 > d(ra   rb   2peL) (1  eL).
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